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ABSTRACT 
In 2001, the Air Force issued AFSPC 001-01, Mission Need Statement for Operationally 
Responsive Spacelift, identifying the need for a responsive launch system ready to launch 
and reach orbit within hours of call-up to deploy space assets in support of military 
operations. Current range operations include months and often years of pre-launch 
planning and infrastructure development in order to meet launch vehicle, customer, and 
safety constraints. This thesis studies the Air Force’s limited ability to support small 
satellite launches into sun-synchronous low earth orbit in response to a Tier-2 ORS 
request, focusing on launching from a single range with two different small payload 
launch vehicles and investigates the potential for making spacelift more responsive. This 
investigation determined that the Air Force is not currently capable of launching either 
vehicle type within a seven day schedule due to a variety of doctrinal, procedural, and 
resource challenges and restrictions. This thesis presents several suggested changes and 
risk mitigation options for overcoming these shortfalls in equipment, personnel, and 
paperwork to increase the responsiveness of spacelift in support of the Air Force and 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the Air Force issued AFSPC 001–01 Mission Needs Statement for 
Operationally Responsive Spacelift. It identifies the need for a responsive launch system, 
“ready to launch within hours of call-up, and to conduct military operations within hours 
of reaching orbit. Spacelift, and the supported space assets, must be able to quickly 
respond to a dynamic threat environment, changing mission requirements, and increased 
operational tempos and utilization rates.”  Since that time, the Air Force has retired the 
Department of Defense (DoD)-owned Titan launch vehicle, thus limiting domestic launch 
options to commercial vehicles purchased from United Launch Alliance, Orbital Sciences 
Corporation, SpaceX. Additionally, considerable downsizing of supporting 
instrumentation sites has occurred on both major launch ranges (Vandenberg Air Force 
Base (AFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station), limiting each range’s ability to 
support more than one operation at any time.   
Current range operations (specifically pre-launch activities that include the use of 
range instrumentation and personnel) average one month of mission preparation prior to 
launch. This estimate does not include the months and often years of pre-launch planning, 
infrastructure development, payload processing and testing, and booster delivery and pad 
setup that have to be accomplished in order to meet launch vehicle, customer, and safety 
constraints. This thesis will investigate the apparent trend toward unresponsiveness and 
evaluate the current ability and shortcomings of meeting an aggressive seven day launch 
schedule in support of urgent needs requests from theater operations commanders.   
This thesis will focus on the Air Force’s ability to support small satellite launches 
into sun-synchronous low earth orbit in response to an Operationally Responsive Space 
(ORS) request, but will focus on launching from a single range, Vandenberg AFB, which 
is the Air Force’s primary launch site for sun-synchronous orbits. Additionally, only two 
launch vehicles will be considered: Orbital Science Corporation’s air launched Pegasus 
and ground launched Minotaur vehicles. Other sites that support high inclination launches 
for Minotaur and Pegasus vehicles include Wallops, Kodiak, and Kwajalein, however 
these will not be addressed in order to refine the scope of this thesis.   
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A. BACKGROUND 
As the world advances further into the space age, the path to ensuring space 
superiority is changing. No longer is it feasible to dominate space and support the 
warfighter solely through conventional long-term acquisition programs utilizing the 
launch-on-schedule method. Recent budget cuts to key space programs like the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) mean a significant reduction in long-term 
acquisition programs and a critical need for more affordable and responsive space assets 
(King 2012, n.p.). ORS and the launch-on-demand method is one proposed approach to 
ensure continued access to space as well as meet the immediate needs of the commanders 
on the ground. 
 
Tier-1 Tier-2 Tier-3 




-Timeline: Hours to Days  
-Replenish and augment with 
existing technologies and 
capabilities 
 
-Timeline: Days to Weeks  
-Replenish and augment with 
newly developed technologies 
and capabilities 
 
-Timeline: Months to 1 Year  
Table 1.   Tiered Approach to Enhance Responsiveness of Space Capabilities (After 
National Security Space Office) 
The Air Force’s ORS Office established definitions for three tiers of 
responsiveness. Tier-1 uses existing and on-station assets to meet a specific need. Many 
of these satellites would be multipurpose, allowing prepositioning of assets that share 
cost with other missions and tasks. The timeline for getting a Tier-1 asset online and 
ready to use is defined as immediate within hours or days. If no on-orbit capabilities exist 
that meet the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) need, the next option is to use a launch 
ready asset. Tier-2 uses Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) and pre-developed standby 
satellites to rapidly deploy a needed capability. To ensure maximum readiness, both 
satellites and launch vehicles need to be launch ready prior to the need arising. The 
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timeline for delivering a Tier-2 asset into orbit and ready to use is defined as days to 
weeks. 
Finally, Tier-3 assets utilize rapid acquisition methods to develop, test, and deploy 
a new satellite capability. Unlike standard space acquisition programs that can take years, 
the timeline for developing, deploying, and activating a Tier-3 asset is months to one year 
(National Security Space Office 2007, 4). On June 29, 2011, the Defense Department’s 
ORS Office successfully launched the ORS-1 satellite. The objective was to design, 
develop, and deploy the ORS-1 satellite in 24 months; the project ultimately took 30 
months. While this is distant from the 12 month vision, it was extremely impressive and 
considered very successful compared to the standard space acquisition timeline 
(Ledbetter 2012, n.p.). 
B. PURPOSE 
There are a lot of fundamental problems facing the ORS Office and Tier-2 
launches.  “Even for small satellites, the satellite build cycle (1–3 years), launch vehicle 
build cycle (12–18 months), range safety and operations (up to 18 months for Eastern and 
Western Ranges), launch site operations (30 days), and on-orbit checkout (weeks) all 
require a lengthy timeline” (Kim and McLeod 2010, 90). To make this program feasible, 
it must be assumed that the build cycles for both the satellite and the launch vehicle have 
been completed in advance. In order to make the ORS concept work, as much preparation 
as possible will have to already be completed before the ORS need arises. Pre-approvals 
through advance planning are critical. 
This thesis will look at the feasibility of ORS from a launch perspective, 
specifically the feasibility of launching a field-ready Tier-2 satellite within a seven day 
timeline, consistent with the “days to weeks” laid out by the ORS Office. Current launch 
operations require at least thirty days from arrival of the booster on-site to the actual 
launch; clearly this pace is not sufficient to meet the needs of ORS. This research will be 
used to recommend changes in architecture and doctrine in order to meet the proposed 
seven day launch schedule. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address three specific questions to gauge current capabilities and 
future potential for operationally responsive spacelift.   
What is the shortest launch schedule that can currently be supported? 
 This question will evaluate the current capabilities of the Pegasus and Minotaur I 
vehicles to respond to a rapid launch request assuming that all tasks that can be 
accomplished prior to launch date selection have been accomplished and using historical 
launch information as a baseline. 
What are the primary obstacles to achieving a seven day launch schedule? 
 This question will assess administrative, operational, and support tasks that 
currently prevent or have the potential to interrupt a seven day launch schedule. 
What changes can be made to reduce the time required from the initial 
request for an ORS response to launch? 
 This question will address mitigation techniques to increase the responsiveness of 
spacelift operations, including tasks that can be accomplished in advance, opportunities 
for standardization to reduce workload and increase personnel proficiency, and other 
administrative changes to the way launch operations are performed. 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Operationally responsive space is still a hot topic among space professionals, 
however the majority of the discussion revolves around the spacecraft, with little 
attention given to the launch vehicles and ranges that must provide on-demand launch 
support. This thesis will identify significant issues that must be addressed in order to 
successfully execute short notice launches. It will also highlight potential areas of 
improvement to minimize the time from initial ORS request to on-orbit support, which is 
critical to the dynamic environment in which today’s military operates. 
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E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on the Air Force’s ability to support small satellite launches 
into sun-synchronous low earth orbit in response to an ORS request from a single range, 
Vandenberg AFB is the Air Force’s primary launch site for sun-synchronous orbits and 
will be the range studied in this paper. Additionally, only two launch vehicles will be 
considered: Orbital Science Corporation’s air launched Pegasus and ground launched 
Minotaur vehicles. The primary assumptions are that the satellite is ready to be delivered 
with all pre-integration testing (including but not limited to vibration and acoustic shock 
testing, vacuum and thermal testing, and subsystem testing) previously completed and 
that a launch vehicle is immediately available. Additionally, the seven day timeline will 
not include on-orbit checkout. This paper assumes that there is value in the responsive 
launch of small payloads, regardless of whether that is a tactical or strategic value. There 
is some debate in the space community about the battlefield utility of a responsive and 
tactical class of satellite, specifically whether or not the physical constraints of low earth 
orbit can meet the operational requirements of a tactical mission; this is beyond scope of 
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II. OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Air Force and the DoD are developing the concept of ORS as the future of 
military space operations. This “launch-on-demand” model is a departure from current 
launch-on-schedule doctrine. To meet the accelerated launch schedule required to support 
ORS, the Air Force must adapt launch range operations and spacelift doctrine. 
The objective of ORS is to rapidly deploy a space asset at the request of 
commanders on the ground to provide space support at the tactical level. It is designed to 
provide “the responsive and affordable delivery of space assets in hours-to-days instead 
of weeks-to-months” (Noel, Escorpizo, and Jones 2004, 7). Currently, launch schedules 
begin years out, with the majority of the operational requirements in writing at least 90 
days prior to the first pre-launch operation (“Western Range User Handbook” 2009, 2-4). 
A typical launch will begin pre-launch operations around 30 days before launch, with 
complex missions and new launch vehicles beginning even sooner. The launch-on-
schedule model will continue to be relevant for large satellites and conventional space 
acquisitions, however significant changes will have to be made to the launch ranges in 
order to accommodate a launch-on-demand architecture. 
B. LAUNCH OPERATIONS 
1. Western Range Overview 
The Western Range (WR), located at Vandenberg AFB, CA, is the DoD’s West 
Coast launch and test range, supporting polar orbit spacelift launches, Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) test launches, and missile defense testing.  “The WR provides 
metric tracking, telemetry acquisition, short and long range photo optics, command 
control, meteorological forecast and real-time observation, area surveillance, 
communications, real-time data processing and post-flight data production” (“Western 
Range User Handbook” 2009, 1-1). Range instrumentation consists of telemetry 
acquisition and processing systems, metric and Global Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking antenna and radars, airspace and ocean surveillance systems, safety command 
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control systems, meteorological sensors, and communication systems. The 30 Space 
Wing (SW) manages the WR; their mission statement is “To provide combat capability to 
the joint warfighter through assured access to space and combat ready airmen” 
(Vandenberg Air Force Base - Home 2012). 
The unique geography at Vandenberg AFB allows rockets to launch due south 
without flying over land until reaching Antarctica, minimizing the risk of spent rocket 
stages or failed rockets from impacting inhabited land areas. Vandenberg is the choice 
location for launching reconnaissance and Earth observation satellites that require polar 
orbits (Day n.d., n.p.). The WR is capable of supporting launch azimuths between 140 
and 201 degrees, as displayed in Figure 1. Since the first launch in 1958, Thor, Atlas, 
Titan, Scout, Athena, Delta, Taurus, Pegasus, and Minotaur family space launch vehicles 
have successfully taken off from the WR. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Orbit Inclinations and Launch Azimuths Available from the Western Range  
(From Wertz and Larson, 734) 
All range operations are conducted in the Western Range Operations Control 
Center (WROCC). The WROCC is designed to be able to conduct two separate launch 
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activities simultaneously, however this capability has not been utilized for real world 
operations. Frequency protection is always a necessity during launch operations in order 
to protect both the launch vehicle and the payload; the WR’s Frequency Control and 
Analysis System maintains an interference-free radio frequency (RF) environment to 
protect launch vehicles, payloads, and personnel (“Western Range User Handbook” 
2009, 4-24). This would be a major concern during dual launch operations, as frequencies 
would have to be assigned in a manner that ensured the frequencies from each operation 
could not interfere with each other. 
2. Requirements 
Radar and telemetry sites must be available to provide real time telemetry and 
vehicle health and status during flight. Command transmitters must have line of site of 
the vehicle from launch until Safety End of Mission to ensure that destruct commands 
can be transmitted to the vehicle if any safety rules are violated. Depending on the launch 
trajectory, local and remote radar, telemetry, and command transmitter sites might be 
mandatory. All communication nets and data links must be functioning during launch 
operations. Additionally, in order to launch safely, each vehicle has specific weather 
constraints that cannot be violated. These requirements will be further discussed in the 
next chapter. 
C. DOCTRINE AND OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVIEW 
1. Air Force Doctrine  
According to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations, 
satellite deployment launch operations are currently conducted using the launch-on-
schedule approach, with launches planned in advance and executed in accordance with a 
standing launch schedule. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, states that, “Due to 
requirements to ensure spacelift availability for all U.S. users, the Air Force conducts 
launch operations based on a launch-on-schedule approach. All users are scheduled for 
spacelift based on priority as well as launch vehicle and payload readiness. Changes to 
published schedules require the formal coordination and approval from all parties 
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affected, or preemption of the existing schedule by the Secretary of Defense” (Air Force 
Doctrine Document 1 2003, 52). 
The concept of launch-on-demand is briefly defined in AFDD 1, but is not 
currently in use.  “This approach provides an alternative means of spacelift whereby 
launches may occur when required to accommodate user needs. Launch-on-demand 
dictates spacelift capability must be obtained in advance of specific requirements” (Air 
Force Doctrine Document 1 2003, 53). An estimated 9% of satellites fail during their 
operational lives (Long, Richards, and Hastings 2007); even for cases where a satellite 
fails well before its projected end-of-life date, the Air Force has primarily followed the 
launch-on-schedule model, occasionally advancing the launch schedule by a couple of 
months, but overall not significantly changing the original schedule. In order to meet 
ORS requirements, the AF would have to further develop the existing but limited launch-
on-demand doctrine to address concerns like prioritization and timelines for launch 
operations. 
2. DoD Instructions 
Department of Defense Directive 3200.11, Major Range and Test Facility Base 
(MRTFB), defines roles and responsibilities for DoD leadership components and bases 
identified as MRTFBs. The directive establishes policy that, “The MRTFB may be used 
by other DoD users (including DoD training users), and by users outside the Department 
such as U.S. Government Agencies, State and local governments, allied foreign 
governments, and commercial entities.”  Additionally, the directive states, “Scheduling of 
the MRTFB shall be based upon a priority system that gives equitable consideration to all 
DoD Components and accommodates DoD acquisition program priorities” (Department 
of Defense Directive 3200.11 2007, 3). Launch-on-demand operations could be 
considered a priority; however, there will be political considerations for deconfliction 
with scheduled Missile Defense Agency (MDA), National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO), foreign allies, and high-value commercial launches.   
DoD 3200.11-D, Major Range and Test Facility Base Summary of Capabilities, 
provides a brief description of all DoD major test activities identified in DoDD 3200.11 
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(Department of Defense Directive 3200.11-D 1983). The summary states that the WR can 
support spacelift and ICBM launches across a wide range of launch azimuths and allows 
for direct polar insertion without flying over any populated areas. In addition to space and 
missile field test operations, the WR also supports a variety of aeronautical tests in the 
West Coast Offshore Operating Area (WCOOA). All launch operations must be 
deconflicted with scheduled aeronautical tests to ensure instrumentation is available and 
frequency protection is maintained.   
3. Range Commanders Council 
The Range Commanders Council (RCC) was established in 1951 to consolidate 
and standardize “the technical and operational needs of U.S. test, training, and 
operational ranges” (Range Commander's Council 2012). The council includes military 
test and launch ranges for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as civilian ranges 
operated by NASA. The RCC provides a way for DoD test ranges to communicate and 
discuss common problems. The RCC Standard 321–10, Common Risk Criteria for 
National Test Ranges, defines consensus standards for the range risk management 
process and risk criteria. The companion document, RCC 321-10 Supplement, provides 
additional detailed information to assist in the implementation of standards in the basic 
document (O'Connor 2010, 15). 
4. Air Force Instructions 
Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-12, Space, identifies the Air Force as the 
DoD executive agent for space launch, responsible for launching satellites for the DoD 
and other government agencies for required orbital operations. Air Force Instruction 
(AFI) 10-1211, Space Launch Operations, implements AFPD 10-12. The instruction 
states that, “AFSPC’s spacelift mission is to ensure successful delivery of space systems 
to support national objectives and provide a decisive advantage to U.S. forces 
worldwide” (Air Force Instruction 10-1211 2006, 2). 
Consistent with DoDD 3200.11, the instruction states that the Space Wing 
Commander must, “Operate the range as part of the DoD MRTFB by providing 
government facilities and range services to all authorized users.” AFI 10-1211 supports 
 12
the concept of ORS through the policy of assured access to space. “United States 
Government space policies identify “assured access to space” as the need to guarantee the 
availability of critical space capabilities for executing space missions” (Air Force 
Instruction 10-1211 2006, 1). Additionally, the instruction briefly addresses schedule 
execution as being a priority based launch queue. This is consistent with the needs of 
changing to a launch-on-demand architecture, with rapid launches holding a higher 
national priority and mission priority—and therefore a higher launch priority—than 
routine commercial, civil, and DoD payloads. 
AFSPCI 10–1208, Spacelift Operations, establishes Air Force Space Command’s 
roles and responsibilities relating to launch operations. Similar to the Air Force level 
instruction, AFSPCI 10–1208 further supports the policy of assured access: “Assured 
mission capability for critical space systems can be achieved only through assured and 
protected access to space” (Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1208 2011, 4). 
Assured access is a critical component of the ORS construct. The instruction also 
considers both launch-on-schedule and launch-on-demand strategies.  “Space lift is a key 
enabler that establishes and supports a broad range of space capabilities. Space lift 
includes two complementary strategies: current routine launch operations and future 
responsive launch operations. The U.S. uses routine launches to populate satellite 
constellations on a scheduled basis and will develop responsive launch operations, or on-
demand launch capabilities, to support more time-critical space support operations” (Air 
Force Space Command Instruction 10-1208 2011, 4). This would support future 
implementation of ORS with minimal change to the instruction.  
While the instruction supports both rapid and long term launch schedules, it does 
dictate that launch operations must be done in a cost-effective manner.  “AFSPC must 
maintain a successful, robust, secure, and modern space lift capability to meet war fighter 
and other national security mission needs. All echelons within AFSPC must strive to 
meet this basic requirement at an affordable cost” (Air Force Space Command Instruction 
10-1208 2011, 8). Maintaining a reasonable price tag while accelerating what is normally 
a one- to two-year process down to a single week will inevitably prove challenging, 
especially in an extremely budget-constrained environment.  
 13
Finally, the instruction directs the Space Wing Commander to conduct a final, 
mandatory Launch Readiness Review (LRR) prior to each operation. An LRR is 
described as an, ..”.Assessment of both the ability to meet the mission design 
requirements and the current launch schedule based on the sum of flight worthiness and 
flight readiness” (Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1208 2011, 41). The Space 
Wing Commander chairs the review, which is attended by the Mission Director, the 
Operations Group Commander, the Chief of Wing Safety, the Mission Support Group 
Commander, Western Range Operations, Communications & Information Services 
(WROCI) Contractor Representative, and the applicable launch vehicle and payload 
representatives. The LRR is normally conducted the day prior to launch and covers 
launch personnel, a brief mission description, an overview of all significant scheduled 
events and their status, launch facility, vehicle and upper stage status, satellite/payload 
status, day of launch weather forecast, range support status, communication network 
support, safety and contingency response support, a summary of significant events in the 
launch countdown, any open items that may impact the launch, and a final go/no-go 
readiness poll. 
AFSPC Manual 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, volumes one through 
seven, define the Range Safety Program for all AFSPC launch activities.  “These 
activities include the life cycle of launch vehicles and payloads from design concept, test, 
checkout, assembly, and launch to orbital insertion or impact” (Air Force Space 
Command Manual 91-710, Volume 1, 2004). The manual also establishes and enforces 
range safety requirements, ensuring that an acceptable level of safety is provided 
throughout all pre-launch, launch, and post-launch operations. Risk management is 
performed for three safety categories—public, launch area, and launch complex safety.   
Volume two discusses flight safety requirements, including flight plan approval 
and data delivery times. Range customers must provide a flight plan with the anticipated 
trajectories so Range Safety analysts can validate the flight plan does not violate any 
safety margins, overland restrictions, or impact restrictions. Preliminary flight plan 
approval is due one year prior to the scheduled launch. Final flight plan approval is due 
60 days prior to launch. Range customers only need to supply required data once if no 
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changes occur from operation to operation, for example if the flight plan is identical to a 
previous launch (Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, 2004, 10–12). 
Table 2 shows the requirements for new and established launch vehicles. 
 
 
Table 2.   Data Requirements Documentation Lead Times (From Air Force Space 
Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, 10) 
AFSPC Manual 91-711, Launch Safety Requirements for Air Force Space 
Command Organizations, provides the policy and requirements needed for AFSPC 
organizations to meet the Launch Safety Program mission.  “The Launch Safety mission 
is to protect the public, launch base personnel (government and contractor), range 
infrastructure, and third party personnel from the hazards associated with AFSPC range 
operations. Launch Safety is a function performed by the Wing Safety organization at 
AFSPC ranges and includes: Systems Safety, Pad Safety, Flight Analysis, and support to 
Flight Operations” (Air Force Space Command Manual 91-711 2007, 5). The manual 
provides guidance for risk assessment for all phases of the launch operation. Each risk is 
assessed individually, and the assessed risks are summed up to provide an overall 
operational risk. Risks evaluated include, but are not limited to, toxic hazards, overflight, 
overpressure, and debris hazards. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Any future sun-synchronous mission launch out of the WR will have to continue 
to adhere to these Air Force, DoD, and RCC regulations, most importantly the required 
major operations and safety milestones. Adhering to them by the letter while executing a 
launch-on-demand mission may prove challenging. Several of these documents may need 
to be modified to reflect the increasingly responsive nature of the spacelift mission 
without sacrificing public safety or ignoring political considerations and implications. In 
an increasingly budget restricted Air Force, it is reasonable to expect further downsizing 
of already limited range resources, which will drive further need to modifications to how 
the WR operates and how doctrine and instructions regulate those operations. 
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III. CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Currently the WR focuses on supporting launch-on-schedule operations. All 
facets of launch preparation are well suited to support operations with one to two years of 
notice. The lengthy schedules allow for sufficient time to deconflict between different 
range customers, flex with launch delays, and train personnel for unique mission events, 
new vehicles, or complicated payload preparation. Orbital Sciences Corporation has 
developed a family of small launch vehicles intended to reduce cost and schedule, while 
still fitting into the launch-on-schedule paradigm.   
B. LAUNCH VEHICLE OVERVIEW 
1. Pegasus XL 
The Pegasus XL is a winged, three-stage, solid rocket booster that is launched 
from an L-1011 aircraft from approximately 39,000 ft (11,887 m) at Mach 0.82 over the 
broad ocean area (BOA). The Pegasus is capable of launching small satellites up to 1,000 
lbs (454 kg) into low earth orbit.  “From the WR, Pegasus can achieve inclinations 
between 70º and 130º” (Pegasus User's Guide 2007, 8). Orbital has launched 41 Pegasus 
rockets since 1990, carrying more than 80 satellites.  36 of those launches were declared 
successes, including all of the last 27 launches, giving the Pegasus one of the most 
successful launch rates currently available (Orbital Sciences Corporation 2012). 
NASA uses a launch vehicle certification process to utilize available launch 
technology while ensuring the risks associated with a given launch vehicle are consistent 
with the risk classification for the payload and mission. Certification is based on launch 
vehicle history, flight anomalies, mission failure resolutions, and NASA technical 
assessments. Three categories exist based on the level of launch vehicle risk: high 
(Category 1), medium (Category 2), and low (Category 3). Payloads are classified into 
four classes: A, B, C, and D. Class A payloads are described as having the highest value; 
the payloads are a high priority, national significance is considered to be high, cost is 
rated as high, the technology and equipment is considered to be very complex, and 
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mission lifetime is expected to be longer than five years. On the opposite end, Class D 
payloads are low priority, low national significance, low cost, medium to low complexity, 
and mission lifetimes are shorter than two years. Class A payloads can only be launched 
on Category 3 launch vehicles. The Pegasus XL is currently the only small launch vehicle 
to have NASA’s Category 3 Certification, permitting it to launch NASA’s highest valued 
payloads (NASA Policy Directive 8610.7D 2008). 
The L-1011 is a low maintenance reusable launch platform; because the Pegasus 
is air launched, no launch pad refurbishment is required between launches. This makes 
the Pegasus a desirable launch vehicle for rapid successive launches. Payload support 
services and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) are located at Vandenberg AFB, 
making it very easy to have vehicles on location in standby status for operationally 
responsive spacelift operations.   
2. Minotaur I 
The Minotaur I is a four-stage solid propellant ground launched vehicle, 
developed by Orbital for the USAF as a, “cost effective, reliable and flexible means of 
placing small satellites into orbit” (“Minotaur I User’s Guide” 2006, 3). The Minotaur 
family includes four other vehicles; for the purpose of this paper, “Minotaur” refers only 
to the Minotaur I launch vehicle. The Minotaur is capable of accommodating orbital 
inclinations between 60º and 120º from VAFB and launches from Space Launch 
Complex-8. Inclinations below 72º require an out-of-plane dogleg which reduces the 
amount of mass for the given payload. The small launch vehicle is capable of launching a 
payload mass of up to 580 kg (1,279 lbs) to an altitude of 185 km (606,955 ft). The 
Minotaur launch vehicle utilizes surplus Minuteman II boosters and proven upper stages 
from Orbital’s Taurus and Pegasus launch vehicles.  “The Minotaur I Launch Support 
Equipment (LSE) is designed to be readily adaptable to varying launch site 
configurations with minimal unique infrastructure required” (“Minotaur I User's Guide” 




launch operations at VAFB, while campaign missions are launched at non-VAFB 
locations. For the baseline mission, spacecraft prelaunch operations are also conducted at 
VAFB. 
The lower stage Minuteman booster, referred to as the Lower Stack Assembly, is 
processed and prepared by Air Force and Orbital personnel.  “Due to operational 
constraints, the Lower Stack Assembly, consisting of the Minuteman motors, is processed 
by the Air Force at a separate facility. After testing by Orbital, it is delivered directly to 
the launch pad to await the arrival of the upper stack” (“Minotaur I User’s Guide” 2006, 
48). It is possible to prepare the Lower Stack Assembly in advance for standby 
operations, with limited checks required to keep it ready for responsive operations, 
however this is not the standard operating procedure. 
The Minotaur has a standard mission response of 18 months. This includes 
vehicle preparation, payload integration, and launch operations. Orbital also advertises 
“responsive launch solutions” available from six months to 48 hours, however this 
solution has not yet been executed within the given timeframe. As of September 2011, 
the Minotaur I launch vehicle had conducted 10 missions with a 100% success rate, 
delivering 33 satellites into orbit (Orbital Sciences Corporation 2012). 
C. LAUNCH DIRECTIVES AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION 
1. UDS Requirements 
The Universal Documentation System (UDS) involves a series of administrative 
submittals and responses. It is used to identify the customer’s requirements and for the 
range to develop operational plans to support those requirements.  “The UDS is a 
standardized documentation system that is accepted and used at a number of MRTFBs. 
The UDS provides a common language and format for stating program, mission, and 
individual operations requirements. This system is a proven means by which the WR 
accepts user requirements and develops plans to operate the range” (“Western Range 
User Handbook” 2009, 2-1). 
The UDS has two types of documents: customer-generated documents, and 
government-generated documents. The customer (or range user) documents identify their 
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mission requirements, while the government documents are a direct response to a 
customer document and identify how the WR will support those requirements. The 
documents are broken down into three levels, as shown in Figure 2. Level one includes 
the Program Introduction and the Statement of Capability or Support. Level one is 
designed to initiate program support planning, and typically begins over two years before 
launch. Level two includes the Program Requirements Document and Program Support 
Plan, documenting system level descriptions, program requirements, and an assessment 
of the range’s ability to support. The final level consists of the Operations Requirements 
(OR) and Operations Directive (OD), used to plan, schedule, and execute program 
operations. The OR must be submitted 60 days prior to the range user’s first operation 
requiring WR support to allow time to complete the OD. The OD consists of three 
sections; the first two are required to be completed no later than 30 days prior to the first 
pre-launch operation, and the final section no later than 30 days prior to launch. The 
Vehicle Peculiar Supplement (VPS) is issued after the launch OD is published and details 
changes to section III of the OD (“Western Range User Handbook” 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2.   Universal Documentation System Flow  
(From “Western Range User Handbook” 2–3) 
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2. Readiness Reviews and Go/No-Go Criteria 
The RCC requires that a LRR be conducted for all launch operations. In addition 
to the LRR, the 30 SW performs two additional readiness reviews: the Range Readiness 
Review (RRR) and the Group Readiness Review (GRR). The RRR is briefed to the 2nd 
Range Operations Squadron (ROPS) commander to ensure 2 ROPS can give a go-
statement at the GRR. The GRR is briefed to the 30 OG commander, and adds the 
weather, intel, and communication status to ensure the OG can give a go-statement at the 
LRR. Additionally, the wing commander has the option to direct a pre-LRR to ensure that 
the briefing is accurate and the briefers are prepared prior to going in front of the launch 
customer. The RRR and the GRR are local requirements and serve primarily as 
reassurance to the respective chair in preparation for the LRR. The LRR is typically 
conducted the day prior to launch, includes all status that is included in the GRR, and 
adds briefings from the payload lead, the launch vehicle team, civil engineering, base 
safety, and public affairs. The LRR has very specific go/no-go criteria that are mandatory 
prior to entering launch countdown.   
a. Weather 
The Vandenberg Base Weather Station operates 24 hours every day to 
monitor weather conditions which may impact operations and to meet the meteorological 
collection needs for a variety of range customers. Weather conditions that can impact 
launch include natural and triggered lightning, upper level winds, surface level winds that 
impact the toxic hazard zones, and visibility. Each vehicle has specific and unique 
weather constraints, supporting safety and launch agency requirements. For example, 
ground launch vehicles like the Minotaur I require wind data to ensure the debris ellipse 
does not extend over manned areas, while the air launched Pegasus will require wind data 
at the airfield to ensure conditions are safe for the L-1011 and any chase aircraft to take 
off. Weather is monitored closely starting five days prior to the scheduled launch. A 
forecast is briefed at the LRR, along with the probability of favorable conditions. While a 
launch can be scrubbed based on the forecast, typically the decision to postpone the 
launch until a backup date will be delayed as long as possible to maximize the chance of 
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launching on time while still preserving the vehicle’s ability to be ready for the next 
approved launch window. Depending on the launch vehicle, certain events like vehicle 
fueling and battery activation can extend the time needed to prepare the mission for a 
second launch attempt beyond the earliest approved backup date. 
b. Instrumentation 
The Range Operations Commander briefs the status of all range 
instrumentation at all readiness reviews. In addition to discussing any issues that may 
affect a site’s ability to support launch operations, all mandatory and required sites in 
support of safety and launch agency constraints are identified. Mandatory sites are those 
that can only be waived by the 30 SW Commander or the Mission Director; required sites 
can be waived at a lower decision level, typically the Senior Mission Fight Control 
Officer or the Launch Director. In the event that there is only one piece of equipment 
available to meet a mandatory requirement, that equipment is referred to as hard 
mandatory; range operators will impose a safety hold for failure of a hard mandatory 
item. No single point of failure will be allowed to prevent range safety personnel from 
maintaining positive control over a launch vehicle through the duration of the flight 
control mission, as there are inherent public safety implications, and likewise no single 
point of failure should cause range safety personnel to send destruct commands to an 
otherwise nominal vehicle due to inherent mission assurance implications (Range Safety 
Operations Requirements 2007, 20). As such, there are considerable redundant 
instrumentation requirements for any launch operation. The Data Control Officer 
summarizes the status of all communication lines supporting the operation and addresses 
any ongoing communication problems.   
c. Safety 
Flight control personnel will brief all the mandatory safety assets as well 
as explain the Mission Rules. The Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO) is authorized 
to terminate flight of a launch vehicle when any of the following Mission Rules are 
violated: public endangerment, erratic performance, or unknown performance. These 
include, but are not limited to, failure to track the vehicle a certain time interval after 
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ignition, crossing destruct lines, failure to “program” (pitch downrange), or loss of all 
vehicle tracking data. Additionally, all hazard areas will be briefed, including land 
closures, railroad hold points, restricted airspace, boat exclusion areas, and any personnel 
evacuation or shelter in place requirements.   
Prior to the LRR, safety personnel conduct the Launch Safety Team (LST) 
Briefing.  “This briefing provides LST members and affected agencies with information 
regarding evacuation of safety control areas, Entry Access Lists (EALs), a chronological 
order for safety actions, facilities/personnel locations inside the Impact Limit Line (ILL), 
fire danger status, bio-environmental hazards, vehicle/payload hazards, and procedures 
for post-launch or abort contingencies” (30th Space Wing Instruction 91-101 2009, 20). 
The ILL extends downrange from the launch site and defines the area in which debris 
from planned stage drops, vehicle explosions, or thrust termination may land, and helps 
define the other hazard areas. Any mission unique safety requirements will be covered for 
each launch. Finally, the Interim Safety Board and mishap investigation authority 
information is discussed to prepare for potential launch mishaps. 
d. Launch Vehicle and Payload Readiness 
All major milestones must be completed prior to entering launch 
countdown. This may include, but is not limited to, payload integration, fueling 
operations, vehicle mating, end-to-end testing, and system checkouts. The LRR includes 
a general overview of the launch vehicle history and the payload’s mission.  
e. Personnel Readiness 
All operations and launch support personnel, including the launch vehicle 
personnel who work on console during launch operations, must be trained and certified in 
their respective positions. Additionally, all operators must be medically cleared by the 
Flight Medicine clinic (Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1202 2008, 9). 
Additional personnel training requirements are at the discretion of training personnel and 
Air Force leadership. 
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 3. Range Safety Operations Requirements (RSOR) 
a. RSOR Overview 
Public Law 81–60 states that spacelift operations can be no more 
dangerous than conventional airplanes flying overhead. The Western Range’s RSOR 
describes the necessary safety requirements for protecting the public, launch personnel, 
and supporting launch operations to that degree.  “The mission element objective is to 
ensure operations result in acceptable risk to the populace and resources and do not 
unduly endanger successful completion of the launch mission” (Range Safety Operations 
Requirements 2007, 18). It is a product of the RCC’s UDS system and contains launch 
vehicle-specific safety information for all vehicles approved to launch on the WR. It 
defines key terms and lists all mandatory and required safety constraints, as well as flight 
readiness criteria. An RSOR Mission-Specific Supplement may be issued to update safety 
requirements for a specific mission that are not included in the parent document.   
The RSOR mandates several pre-launch checks, including open and closed 
loop verification for command transmitters and automatic failover checks. The checks are 
conducted during Flight Termination System (FTS) end-to-end checks and again during 
the launch countdown. The RSOR addresses all mandatory and required constraints for 
safety. The difference between mandatory and required is the level of the waiver 
authority; mandatory constraints can only be waived by the Launch Decision Authority, 
while required constraints can be waived by the Chief of Safety or the Senior Mission 
Flight Control Officer. Some apply to all operations, while others are vehicle specific. 
For any launch out of the WR, clearance of all restricted areas, including within the ILL, 
the boat exclusion areas, and designated airspace is mandatory for safety. In order to 
ensure that all instrumentation sites are able to track the launch vehicle, a positive liftoff 
indication must be received and transmitted to initiate instrumentation sequences. All 
range safety weather constraints are stated within the RSOR and must be met at liftoff.   
b. Pegasus Requirements 
One local radar site with visibility of the drop box is mandatory for safety, 
with a second local site required. One local telemetry sensor and two local non-collocated 
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command transmitters are also mandatory for safety. There are no requirements for 
remote radar, telemetry, or command transmitter sites. The Pegasus is launched over the 
BOA, therefore no railroad hold points are needed, there are no land closures, and there is 
no launch support team due to the inability for debris to impact land based on the location 
at which the vehicle is air dropped. Surveillance of the drop box boat exclusion area is 
mandatory. This can be accomplished by sea craft, the Ocean Surveillance System, or by 
aircraft. 
c. Minotaur I Requirements 
One local radar site with visibility of the launch pad and one remote site 
are mandatory for safety, and a second local site is required. One local and one remote 
telemetry sensor are mandatory for safety. Two local non-collocated command 
transmitters and two remote transmitters are also mandatory for safety. SLC-8 requires 
railroad protection for approximately 14 miles of track. Land closures, boat exclusion 
areas, and oil platform evacuation or sheltering are determined based on the flight 
azimuth and trajectory of the vehicle and where stage separations occur.     
d. Documentation Review and Briefings 
Several reviews and briefings must occur prior to the final readiness 
review. The Network Implementation Plan Review ensures that all personnel work 
stations have the required communications. This review typically occurs around 30 days 
out, but can be done closer to launch if needed. It is not unusual for the plan to be revised 
after a dress rehearsal if a previously unknown communication need is identified. All 
personnel who will be sitting on console for launch are required to attend. The 
Instrumentation Support Briefing reviews all the instrumentation that will be supporting 
an operation, consistent with the approved OD. This briefing occurs shortly after the final 
launch OD is published, typically one to two weeks prior to launch. The LST brief is also 
held between one and two weeks before launch, and is discussed further later on in this 
chapter.    
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D. KEY MISSION EVENTS 
1. Scheduling 
There are two types of pre-launch events, and each is scheduled somewhat 
differently. Internal pre-launch activities are scheduled by the launch agency. Those 
activities do not require outside support and can proceed at whatever pace the launch 
agency has the personnel and equipment to support. Any activity that involves base 
personnel, equipment, or hazardous operations is scheduled and managed by 2 ROPS 
scheduling office. AFSPC maintains a 48-month launch schedule called the Space 
Launch Manifest (SLM). The SLM is reviewed quarterly, and primarily follows launch-
on-schedule doctrine. As a result, the WR launch schedule generally operates on a first-
come first-serve basis. Launches are forecasted 3 to 11 years prior to launch depending 
on the payload, user requirements, budget constraints, and national priorities. AFSPC 
reserves the right to direct mission de-stacking operations to allow another mission to 
move forward to launch in the interest of national priorities (Air Force Space Command 
Instruction 10-1213 2012, 17). 
Additional support requests are based on range priorities and resource availability.  
“Launch, major launch milestone tests, critical maintenance activities and pre-launch 
calibration (L-1 day) checks normally will be assigned the highest priority followed by 
other range activities; to include preventative maintenance and periodic depot 
maintenance” (30th Space Wing Instruction 13-203 2011, 5). 
Approved launch dates and associated critical milestones already on the schedule 
almost always receive priority over new launch requests.  2 ROPS scheduling requires 
requests for major pre-launch activities to be submitted at least 30 calendar days in 
advance in order to allow time to deconflict other scheduled operations. Minor activities 
can be scheduled as late as one week in advance. Due to budget constraints and a heavy 
reliance on contractor support, the WR operates a 40-hour work week. Special 
coordination and approval is required for overtime support.   
 27
2. Integration 
The first major phase of ground and launch processing is launch vehicle 
integration. The Pegasus vehicle and the upper stage of the Minotaur I are horizontally 
assembled and fully tested at the Orbital integration site at VAFB. The vehicle integration 
and test process ensures all components and subsystems are thoroughly tested. 
The second major phase is payload processing and integration. Initial payload 
preparation and checkout are typically performed by payload personnel. Once the 
payload has checked out, it is mated with the launch vehicle. All interfaces are verified 
and tested after final connections are made. For the Minotaur I, final integration of the 
upper stage and the Minuteman II booster are conducted at the pad. 
3. Installation 
Aircraft mating for the Pegasus vehicle typically takes place about 3 to 4 days 
prior to launch. The interfaces between the launch vehicle, the operations consoles, and 
the aircraft are tested and verified before and again after mating the launch vehicle to the 
carrier aircraft. The Minotaur I completes the integration process at the launch pad. It is 
vertically stacked at the pad and final tests are completed to verify vehicle integrity.   
4. Safety Checkout 
The primary pre-launch safety checkout is called the FTS End-to-End Checks. 
These checks are performed on the FTS in final flight configuration as close to launch as 
possible, and must occur within 72 hours of liftoff. Launch delays or launch vehicle 
configuration changes can result in the end-to-end checks having to be repeated. Range 
equipment and transmitters must be available to support FTS checks. Using an ordnance 
simulator in place of the actual flight ordnance initiators, FTS checks demonstrate that 
the command termination systems deliver the required energy to initiate the FTS 
ordnance and must be conducted on all strings of the FTS system (Range Commanders 
Council Document 319-10 2010, 5-1). 
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5. Instrumentation Checkout 
There are two critical instrumentation checkouts that occur prior to day of launch. 
The first is the Range Interface Test. This test verifies the vehicle to range interfaces and 
satisfies range safety requirements. It includes testing of all supporting radar and 
telemetry sites, command transmitters, all data and communication lines, liftoff indicators 
and distribution, countdown clocks, and status indicators. 
The second checkout is the Pre-Launch Calibrations, also called L-1 Day Checks. 
As the name indicates, this test is typically conducted the last duty day before launch. 
Final instrumentation calibration checks are conducted, after which the range is locked 
down and no changes to launch configuration are authorized (30th Space Wing 
Instruction 13-203 2011, 6). 
E. LAUNCH VEHICLE AND RANGE OPERATIONS CREWMEMBERS 
1. Training 
Depending on the type of launch, the composition of the launch team varies. 
Spacelift launch teams consist of the range operations crew, launch vehicle crew, and 
payload crew. Crew position titles may vary depending on which civil, military, or 
contractor entities are involved.   
Military range personnel include the Launch Decision Authority (typically the 
wing commander or vice), the Operations Director (typically the OG commander or 
deputy), the Range Operations Commander (ROC), the Mission Flight Control Officer 
(MFCO), the Range Control Officer (RCO), the Aerospace Control Officer (ACO), and 
the Launch Weather Officer (LWO). The Senior MFCO and the Data Control Officer are 
typically AF civilians. These positions all must be in compliance with AFSPCI36–2202.   
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) commander appoints, trains, and 
certifies an Mission Director (MD) for every DoD launch of SMC-acquired launch 
systems and services. The NRO and other agencies appoint their own MDs for their own 
respective launches and have their own internal training and certification programs. 
Mission directors are responsible for ensuring space flight worthiness and are the lead for 
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the launch vehicle and payload teams. The launch vehicle lead has fleet-wide 
responsibility for the launch vehicle program and is trained and certified by the launch 
agency. They may specialize in a single vehicle or be responsible for a LV family. The 
satellite vehicle lead is typically the program director for the payload acquisition 
program. They are trained and certified by their respective program office (Air Force 
Space Command Instruction 10-1208 2011, 14). Launch rehearsals are typically used as 
final training and occasionally as final certification for non-range personnel.   
There are three general types of rehearsals: Green Card Rehearsals, Wet Mission 
Dress Rehearsals (MDRs), and Dry MDRs. A Green Card Rehearsal is a communication 
only countdown during which “green card” inputs are injected to simulate vehicle, range, 
and weather status. The objective is for key members of the launch team to practice 
anomaly processing and resolution (Space Launch Sample Mission 1 Mission 
Requirements Document 2011, 16). It is not unusual for the 30 SW to conduct one or 
more range-only rehearsals, utilizing green cards, but only including the range operations 
crew. This ensures that the combat mission ready (CMR) and basic mission ready (BMR) 
range personnel are familiarized with all of the vehicle specific procedures without the 
launch agency personnel present. For many range operators, range-only rehearsals are 
their first time running countdown procedures for the vehicle they are preparing to 
launch. 
MDRs are used to certify vehicle and launch procedures and typically include the 
entire launch team. The difference between a wet and dry dress rehearsal is that during a 
dry dress rehearsal, the vehicle is powered down, while during a wet dress rehearsal all 
flight systems are powered. Depending on the number of pre-launch operations and the 
complexity of the mission, the launch agency can elect to forgo a Dry MDR and only do 
a single Wet MDR. It is also not unusual to have multiple dry and wet rehearsals for 
unusually complex operations, inexperienced crews, or new procedures. 
The WR averages approximately 12 launches per year for various launch vehicles 
and payloads. Over a three to four year tour, a military range operator may work 
anywhere from three to twelve launches. As such, the level of experience for a particular 
vehicle varies heavily from operator to operator. Training scenarios generally focus on 
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the vehicles that launch most often, such as the Minuteman III. Vehicles like the Pegasus 
and Minotaur I do not launch regularly from the WR, meaning that the number of current 
operators who have experience with either vehicle is very low. Several rehearsals will be 
necessary to familiarize crews and mitigate risk of operator error. Currently, the WR does 
not have set crews and operators are not trained for specific vehicles. Depending on the 
level of experience for a particular crew, 30 SW leadership may require additional range 
only rehearsals to prepare a crew.   
2. Readiness 
All CMR operators must complete an initial or upgrade evaluation, meet medical 
qualifications, and complete a formal certification briefing prior to being certified (Air 
Force Space Command Instruction 10-1202 2008, 8). In order to maintain currency, 
CMR operators must attend monthly classroom and quarterly scenario training, pass an 
annual evaluation, and receive training on all tasks for their crew position every 12 
months. Operators who fail to maintain currency or meet medical qualifications are 
placed in restricted status and cannot perform crew actions (Air Force Space Command 
Instruction 36-2202 Volume 1 2010, 16). 
Crews are typically forecast several months in advance of a launch, but may 
change multiple times prior to beginning pre-launch operations, approximately 30 days 
from launch. At that time operators will start to receive launch documentation and 
procedures and begin preparations. Operators are able to take leave on a case by case 
basis, permitting that there is no impact to operation support, as there is no requirement 
for on call status since all operations are scheduled at least a week in advance. Similar to 
aircrew, launch team personnel are required to take adequate crew rest prior to 
conducting launch operations. Crew force management personnel verify that all operators 
are current with their training and that they meet medical requirements prior to the LRR.   
The Launch Support Team begins initial preparations approximately 45 days out. 
Training includes launch mishap and evacuation procedures, breathing apparatus 
certification, and day of launch responsibilities. Key tasks for the LST include plotting 
roadblock locations, determining manned support locations within the hazard area, 
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requesting “hold harmless” letters from any tenant organizations that may have valued 
assets within the hazard area, submission of the launch support plan and EAL, and the 
LST Brief. Team readiness is briefed 10 days prior to launch at the LST Brief and again 
at the LRR. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Currently, the WR is more than capable of supporting launch-on-schedule 
operations for the Pegasus and Minotaur I vehicles. The Pegasus boasts a proven and 
reliable launch history, while the Minotaur is a cost effective alternative for smaller 
payloads. There are a lot of documentation, safety, scheduling, vehicle processing, and 
personnel requirements for both vehicles that have minimal impact to a launch-on-
schedule operation, but could pose significant delays to a launch-on-demand program. 
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IV. RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The long term vision for the ORS Office and USSTRATCOM is a responsive six 
day launch schedule. The TacSat-2 mission in 2006 demonstrated a limited capability to 
perform the final vehicle preparation activities within that six day window, however 
certain critical events, like range operations, crew preparation, and payload checkout 
were not factored in to that timeline. To determine the current supportable launch 
schedule, it is necessary to review the most recent launches and compare those timelines. 
Additionally, a significant number of assumptions must be made to begin the one week 
timeline at payload delivery. These assumptions pose a significant obstacle to achieving 
the seven day launch schedule. There are opportunities to make changes to the current 
processes in order to reduce the time required, all which will be addressed within this 
chapter. 
B. RELEVANT LAUNCH HISTORY 
Relevant launch history will look at the most recent Pegasus and Minotaur 
launches from the WR and the TacSat-2 launch from Wallops Island. The most recent 
WR launches provide perspective on the current pace of launch operations, establishing 
what the minimum achievable timeline is without addressing any of the limiting factors. 
The TacSat-2 mission was a demonstration of the ORS capabilities of the Minotaur I and 
evaluated the launch vehicle’s ability to meet a condensed timeline. 
1. Pegasus AIM 
The most recent Pegasus launch out of Vandenberg AFB was in April 2007. The 
Pegasus XL Rocket successfully delivered the 200kg Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere 
(AIM) spacecraft into a 600km sun-synchronous orbit. Figure 3 shows the typical 
advertised integration and test schedule for the Pegasus, beginning with motor delivery 
15 months prior to launch and culminating in day of launch. This timeline is designed for 
the typical 24- to 30-month launch-on-schedule baseline mission cycle. Of particular 
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interest are events that occur after payload delivery. These are the events that cannot be 
accomplished prior to the ORS Tier-2 mission identification.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Typical Pegasus Integration and Test Schedule  
(From “Pegasus User’s Guide” 48) 
The chart shows payload arrival at four to five months prior to launch, however 
the “Pegasus User’s Guide” states that, “a typical Pegasus payload is delivered to the 
integration site at launch minus 30 calendar days.”    It also allows for the majority of the 
last two months being allocated for pre-fairing closeout and fairing installation. This 
timeline is very conservative, as the actual schedule for the AIM mission demonstrates 
(Pegasus User's Guide 2007, 49). 
Table 3 shows the actual vehicle processing timeline for the AIM mission. The 
AIM spacecraft arrived at Vandenberg AFB 45 days before launch. Payload integration 
and mating occurred 3 weeks out and fairing installation was completed less than two 
weeks out. All three of these significant events were well ahead of Orbital’s advertised 
timeline, but still shy of the desired seven day schedule. The last critical launch vehicle 
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processing milestone was mating the Pegasus to the L-1011 aircraft, which was 
accomplished three days prior to launch. 
 
Date Day Event 
11 Mar 07 L-45 Payload Arrival 
15–16 Mar 07 L-41, 40 Payload Testing 
24 Mar 07 L-32 Flight Simulation #3 
24 Mar 07 L-32 Separation System to Payload Mating 
27 Mar 07 L-29 Integration Testing & Flight Simulation 
3 Apr 07 L-22 Payload Mating Fit Check 
4 Apr 07 L-21 Payload Mating 
12–13 Apr 07 L-13, 12 Fairing Installation 
Table 3.   Pegasus AIM Launch Vehicle Processing Timeline  
(After Kennedy Media Gallery) 
Section I and II and of the OR and OD were submitted and approved fall of 2004 
as standard documentation for the pre-launch activity for all Pegasus launches from the 
WR. The mission specific OR was submitted 60 days prior to launch and the Section III 
Launch OD was published 30 days prior to launch. These documents identified unique 
requirements for the AIM payload and tasked specific range assets in support of safety 
and launch agency requirements. The updated countdown manual was delivered 12 days 
before launch and included updated procedures from recent launch activity and payload 
specific countdown steps. 
Table 4 shows the major range operations. Range activity began 27 days prior to 
launch, starting with range only mission dress rehearsals. Three rehearsals were 
conducted due to the lack of experience of the range operations crew with the Pegasus 
launch vehicle and the absence of any customer requested rehearsals. The remaining 
major operations all occurred within six days of launch. All range activities were 
scheduled and completed on weekdays during normal duty hours with the exception of 
the two hazardous operations. Pegasus transportation and mating to the L-1011 aircraft 
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were conducted on a Sunday, which reduced the risk associated with transport of 
hazardous materials. 
 
Date Day  Op #  Op Title  
30 Mar 07 L-26  W4124  Range-only MDR #1  
6 Apr 07 L-19  W1279  Range-only MDR #2  
11 Apr 07 L-14  W9866  Range-only MDR #3  
19 Apr 07 L-6  W6916  Network Simulation (Rehearsal)  
20 Apr 07 L-5  W6148  FTS End-To-End Test  
22 Apr 07 L-3  W6936  Pegasus Transportation (HAZ)  
22 Apr 07 L-3  W6944  Pegasus Mate to L-1011 (HAZ)  
23 Apr 07 L-2  W6966  Combined System Test  
23 Apr 07 L-2  T1460  System Validation Check  
25 Apr 07 L-0  W1292  Pegasus AIM  
Table 4.   Pegasus AIM Major Range Operations (After Buchholz 1) 
 Based on the Pegasus AIM mission, the current timeline for launch vehicle 
processing is approximately 45 days and the timeline for major range operations is 
approximately 10 days. While the AIM mission was well ahead of the nominal four- to 
five-month schedule, there is a considerable amount of trim required to complete all 
activities after payload arrival within one week. 
2. Minotaur I NROL-66 
The most recent Minotaur I to launch from Vandenberg was in February 2011. 
The mission was codenamed NROL-66 and carried a classified satellite into orbit for the 
National Reconnaissance Office. Due to the classified nature of the payload, exact details 
of the payload size and final orbital characteristics were not released. The mission 
description stated that the satellite was launched into a polar low earth orbit. 
The last Minotaur I launched from Vandenberg more than four years before 
NROL-66, and as a result updated pre-launch requirements were submitted as opposed to 
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utilizing existing documentation.   The complete pre-launch and launch OR was 
submitted October 2010. Section I and II of the OD were published 60 days before launch 
and the Section III Launch OD was published 30 days before launch. The countdown 
manual was delivered four weeks before launch.   
Table 5 shows the major range operations. The first significant range activity was 
a green card rehearsal, which was conducted 24 days prior to launch. The launch slipped 
one day due to technical issues with a range command transmitter. The second green card 
rehearsal and the launch were conducted on weekends. The launch window for this 
mission was 0400–0700 local time; all other range activities were scheduled and 
completed on weekdays during normal duty hours. 
 
Date Day Op # Op Title  
13 Jan 11 L-22  W4940  Green Card Rehearsal #1  
27 Jan 11 L-9  W2916  Range Interface Test  
28 Jan 11 L-8  W8846  Range Only Rehearsal  
29 Jan 11 L-7  W2922  Green Card Rehearsal #2  
1 Feb 11 L-4  W2924  Mission Dress Rehearsal  
2 Feb 11 L-3  W2934  FTS End-To-End Test  
2 Feb 11 L-3  T9918  System Validation Check  
3 Feb 11 L-2  T9894  L-1 Day Checks  
5 Feb 11 L-0  W6766  Minotaur I NROL-66  
Table 5.   Minotaur I NROL-66 Major Range Operations (After Buchholz 1) 
The typical timeline for a baseline launch-on-schedule Minotaur I mission from 
mission authorization to launch is 18 months. Launch vehicle integration and testing is 
performed between four to nine months before launch. Payload integration and launch 
operations are conducted in the last 30 days prior to launch. 
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3. Minotaur I TacSat-2 Mission 
TacSat-2 launched aboard a Minotaur I rocket December 2006 from Wallops 
Island. The mission was sponsored by the Air Force Research Lab in support of ORS 
initiatives. All pre-launch activities, from payload mating to launch, were independently 
monitored and timed, demonstrating the responsive launch capabilities of the Minotaur I 
launch vehicle. The objective was to determine if the Minotaur had the capability to meet 
the one week call-up goal for ORS Tier II. The normal 18 month timeline was condensed 
down to six months from contract award to launch. “The Air Force requested that the 
final launch integration efforts be measured as a baseline of current integration and 
launch capabilities” (Schoneman et al. 2007, 8). The results indicate that final processing 
could be completed in a cumulative time of six days, meeting the one week requirement.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Timing of Processes from Spacecraft Mate Through Launch – Minotaur  
(From Schoneman, Amorosi and Laidley 9) 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative time required to complete all vehicle processing 
activities. The TacSat-2 timeline began with payload mating, failing to take into account 
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the time required to perform spacecraft testing and final checkout prior to mating. This 
would only allow for a single 24 hour period to accomplish all payload checkout 
procedures. Due to budget constraints and the scope of the evaluation, all operations were 
conducted on standard single-shifts. The total time for all activities was combined, resting 
on the assumption that ORS launch preparation would be conducted with three shifts of 
crews supporting operations 24 hours a day and seven days a week. An important item to 
note was that the procedures were not streamlined or otherwise rehearsed in an effort to 
cut down the total time required, leaving room for improvement to their six day timeline. 
C. SUPPORTABLE LAUNCH SCHEDULE 
There have been no attempts to perform a launch-on-demand operation out of the 
WR, so there are some assumptions and estimates that must occur to determine what the 
shortest possible launch schedule is at this time. The estimates weight heavily on 
Orbital’s findings during the TacSat-2 mission. It is assumed that the right personnel (and 
the right number of personnel) are available to support around-the-clock operations. 
Additionally, all events that can occur prior to payload delivery, including submitting all 
the required UDS documentation, flight plans, etc, are assumed to be complete. Failure to 
do so would clearly add significant length to the estimated schedules. 
1. Minotaur I 
Based on the recent launch history and paying particular interest in the capability 
demonstrated during the TacSat-2 mission, the current supportable launch schedule for 
the Minotaur I vehicle is still outside the one week objective. All combined range and 
launch agency activities would require 10 days for completion, assuming complete 
availability of all personnel, assets and 24-hour operations, as shown in Table 6. Values 
that were not measured during the TacSat-2 mission were estimated based on the 





Day Event Description  Duration (hrs) 
L-10 Payload Delivery 0 
L-9 Payload Testing 24 
L-8 Flight Simulation 6 
L-8 Separation System to Payload Mating 6 
L-8 Integration Testing and Flight Simulation 12 
L-7 Payload Mating Fit Check 12 
L-7 Payload Mating 3 
L-7 NIP Review 0 
L-7 Instrumentation Brief 0 
L-6 Upper Stack Ordnance Connections 16 
L-6 Range Only Rehearsal 0 
L-6 Lower Stack Emplacement 5.75 
L-6 Thermal Cover Installation 2.75 
L-6 Lower Stack Transport & Tie Down 3 
L-5 Fairing Installation 38 
L-5 LST Briefing 0 
L-4 Shear Pins Installation 6.5 
L-3 MMODS (FTS) Installation 17 
L-3 GRR 0 
L-3 Lower Umbilical 3.5 
L-3 Transfer Upper Stack into T.E. 9  
L-3 Upper Stack Transportation 2 
L-2 Upper Stack Emplacement 10.5  
L-2 Rate Gyro Installation 7 
L-2 Post Stack Verification Test 4  
L-2 Mission Dress Rehearsal 2  
L-1 Range Interface Test 3  
L-1 FTS S/S and FCDC Connections 1.5  
L-1 FTS End-to-End Testing 2  
L-1 L-1 Closeouts 6.25  
L-1 LRR 1.5  
L-0 Crew Rest 12  
L-0 Launch Operations 5  
Table 6.   Minotaur I Estimated Current ORS Capability 
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Durations of zero represent fixed milestones, like payload delivery, or concurrent 
activities, like documentation reviews, range only rehearsals, and range briefings. 
Payload testing and fairing installation are the most time consuming events, and as such 
represent the largest opportunity for process streamlining.   
 
Day Event Description  Duration (hrs) 
L-8 Payload Delivery 0 
L-7 Payload Interface Verification Testing 24 
L-6 Flight Simulation 6 
L-6 Separation System to Payload Mating 6 
L-6 Integration Testing and Flight Simulation 12 
L-5 Payload Mating Fit Check 12 
L-5 Payload Mating 3 
L-5 NIP Review 0 
L-5 Instrumentation Brief 0 
L-5 Range Only Rehearsal 0 
L-5 Pre-Fairing Closeout Activities 3 
L-4 Fairing Installation 38 
L-4 LST Briefing 0 
L-3 Vertical Fin Removal 17 
L-3 GRR 0 
L-2 Network Simulation 12 
L-2 FTS End-to-End Testing 2  
L-2 Pegasus Transport 6 
L-2 Pegasus Mate to L-1011 6 
L-2 Combined System Test 6 
L-2 Mission Dress Rehearsal 2  
L-1 System Validation Check 3  
L-1 L-1 Closeouts 6.25  
L-1 LRR 1.5  
L-0 Crew Rest 12  
L-0 Launch Operations 5  
Table 7.   Pegasus Estimated Current ORS Capability 
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2. Pegasus 
To determine the Pegasus supportable launch schedule, the primary assumption is 
that there are a lot of correlations between the Pegasus vehicle and the Minotaur I. Events 
that took one day to complete for the AIM mission were given a value of 12 hours; those 
that took two days were given a value of 24 hours. This is clearly a very conservative 
estimate, and as such represents considerable opportunity for schedule reduction and 
streamlining. Based on all of these assumptions, the current supportable launch schedule 
for the Pegasus vehicle is just outside the one week objective. All combined range and 
launch agency activities would require eight days for completion, as shown in Table 7.    
Identical to the Minotaur I schedule, payload testing and fairing installation are again the 
most time consuming events. With streamlined launch vehicle preparation procedures 
and some of the other schedule mitigation items discussed in the following paragraphs, it 
is quite possible that the ambitious seven day schedule could be met for one or both 
vehicles. 
D. PRE-LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS 
1. ORS Tier-2 Launch Profile 
In order to meet the high demands of a rapid response launch schedule, certain 
decisions need to be made well before a need is identified. The ORS Office needs to 
establish a standardized ORS Tier-2 launch profile; all subsequent actions are based off 
of that information. First, an ORS orbit (inclination and altitude) or set of orbits must be 
established from which Tier-2 missions can be derived from. One option is to use a 
parking orbit, from which a variety of operational orbits can be achieved. Additional 
calculations would have to be made to ensure constant launch mass as different orbits 
may require different amounts of onboard fuel. Another option is to utilize a single 
operational orbit and form a constellation of ORS Tier-2 payloads. Due to the shorter 
lifespan requirements of an ORS mission, this could feasibly be done without concern of 
deploying too many satellites into the same orbit.   
Second, a fixed payload and launch mass or set of masses must be set. Limiting 
the number of variables is critical to ensure any payload can be loaded onto any standby 
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vehicle with minimal modifications to the fuel, launch profile, and safety assessments. 
Foremost, this simplifies the development of standardized COTS payloads that can be 
selected to fulfill an ORS requirement. Standardizing the payloads would also include 
using a common payload interface; this allows for a common procedure for payload 
integration, which can be rehearsed in advance, reducing the time required to complete 
the integration tasks.  Additionally, the mass significantly impacts the flight profile and 
safety assessments.  Using a fixed launch mass allows planners to model a single profile 
that can be applied to all ORS Tier-2 launches, minimizing the number of unique items 
for each launch, which simplifies training, preparation, and day of launch activities. In 
accordance with AFSPC Manual 91–710, identical flight paths do not have to be 
resubmitted for flight and safety analysis. By using a pre-approved flight path, range 
customers eliminate the 60 day requirement for submission. All of these mitigation 
procedures would allow for a single, reusable flight profile, reducing the pre-launch 
operations to something as simple as pulling an approved profile from the shelf. 
2. Crew Readiness 
Crews will have to be assigned and put on call for a set period of time to ensure 
availability and readiness. Leave for military members may need to be restricted to the 
local area. A period of one month minimizes the number of crews requiring readiness 
training each year without putting undue burden on the crew members. The on call period 
should begin with a range-only Mission Dress Rehearsal and a Range Readiness Review. 
Additional crew training and launch vehicle familiarization could be scheduled on a crew 
or individual basis as needed based on the MDR performance, ensuring all crew members 
are ready prior to mission identification. All crew force management activities could also 
be accomplished at the beginning of the on call period, ensuring all personnel are 
medically cleared and have met all recurring training and evaluation requirements for 
currency.   
The ROC and OD/LDA Mission Plan is a labor intensive job aid required by the 
30 SW. Both are developed by the ROC and approved by the 2 ROPS Director of 
Operations. In order to minimize extra work and streamline the development timeline, the 
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requirement to build an approved ORS Tier-2 Mission Plan should be included as part of 
the ROC Certification. This would allow for personalization by the operator with a nearly 
complete draft already on hand. Formatting and verbiage should be updated whenever a 
ROC is assigned as an on-call crewmember to incorporate changes and lessons learned 
from the most recent launches.   
3. Documentation 
The UDS system involves a series of administrative submittals and responses, 
ultimately resulting in the Operations Directive for a specific launch. Typically, 
commercial launches require a unique Launch OD due to the multitude of variables that 
affect commercial satellite launches. A Mission Specific OR is submitted, and from those 
requirements Section III is written and published. The WR has streamlined the OD 
process for ICBM launches due to the consistent nature of test launches. A similar 
strategy could be employed for a Tier-2 ORS launch. Specific information could be 
added by means of a VPS, a process already in use. This would allow the WR to pull the 
generic ORS OD Section III off the shelf and begin mission planning right away instead 
of having to rewrite the document every time.   
Countdown manuals are typically due two weeks prior to first use. Similar to 
using an off the shelf OD, by keeping as many launch parameters the same as possible 
and by standardizing the payload checkout procedures, a single pre-approved range 
countdown manual could be used for ORS launches. Much like the ICBM countdown 
manual, very little would have to change between different ORS launches, and payload 
peculiarities could be addressed with change pages instead of writing a mission specific 
countdown manual. This has the added benefit of allowing military range personnel to 
train with the same countdown manual that would be used on day of launch, eliminating 
some of the risk and challenge of launching with seven days notice. 
E. LIMITING FACTORS 
There are a significant number of limiting factors that will impact the ability to 
meet an accelerated launch schedule. First, final launch vehicle preparation cannot occur 
for either vehicle until the payload has been integrated; the Minotaur I upper and lower 
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stacks are not integrated without the payload, and the Pegasus cannot be mated with the 
L-1011 without it. Payload integration and testing and fairing installation are not possible 
until after mission declaration when a payload is selected; as seen earlier, these are the 
two longest events in the launch timeline.   
There is a certain level of uncertainty in instrumentation availability, which makes 
universal ORS Tier-2 launch documentation impossible. Depot level maintenance, age 
related failures, and other operational requirements can all influence a site’s ability to 
support a launch. A VPS will be necessary for every ORS launch, specifying which 
instrumentation sites will be utilized. Frequency protection requirements may also change 
depending on what the ORS payload is, as well as what other vehicles and payloads are 
already in place on other launch pads. In addition to deconflicting frequencies, schedule 
deconfliction will also be necessary. Decision makers will have to prioritize between the 
ORS launch and launch-on-schedule operations that may be days away from launch, 
either delaying launch dates or finding innovative ways to share resources in a way that 
allows both operations to proceed.   
Weather is an uncontrollable factor that will impact the ability to meet the seven 
day schedule. Hazardous operations like vehicle transportation and fueling can be 
delayed or scrubbed due to inclement weather, and launch operations cannot violate 
mandatory weather constraints. There is no way to mitigate the weather, but it must be 
considered as a limiting factor. 
The Launch Readiness Review is required by AF Instructions, and is held one day 
prior to launch. This cannot be accomplished in advance, and does require a lot of work 
and preparation by key range personnel. The LRR is typically the last action prior to 
releasing all personnel for crew rest. Eight hours of crew rest is required for all range 
operators prior to arriving on console for launch countdown operations. Crew rest does 
not affect the range’s ability to support L-1 checks, as those actions do not need to be 
accomplished by the launch team personnel, but it can prevent MDRs from being 
executed the day before launch depending on the scheduled launch window.   
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Launch crews include military, contractor, launch vehicle, and spacecraft 
personnel. Launch vehicle and spacecraft personnel are not all located at Vandenberg 
AFB, and sending individuals out there on a routine basis for green card dress rehearsals 
prior to mission identification is not cost efficient. For the first few Tier-2 ORS launches 
it will be essential for the launch crew to complete a full mission dress rehearsal. As 
crewmembers gain experience and Tier-2 launches become more routine, the requirement 
for multiple full scale rehearsals may be able to be waived.   
Budget will be a critical factor in a Tier-2 ORS mission. The cost of maintaining a 
launch vehicle in standby mode will be significant, especially if the demand for launches 
is low. Additionally, the price of retaining the parts required to rapidly build an off-the-
shelf satellite may also be cost prohibitive.    
F. CURRENT STATE OF OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACELIFT 
1. Improving Spacelift Responsiveness 
Several key assumptions were made while estimating the shortest possible launch 
schedules. In order to make those assumptions valid within an established launch-on-
demand culture, a certain level of emphasis on improvements is needed. First and 
foremost, Tier-2 launch vehicles will need to be purchased in advance and prepositioned 
in a hot standby mode with all preparation activities up until payload integration already 
completed. This is a drastic change to the current space launch model in which vehicles 
do not begin launch preparation until after assignment to a payload mission occurs. 
Maintaining a vehicle in an ongoing state of readiness may present several challenges, 
including a need for increased launch vehicle personnel which may drive up costs for 
conventional launch-on-demand vehicles, vehicle issues that stem from waiting in a ready 
state for prolonged periods of time, and a potential increase of launch failures due to the 
time lapse between critical launch vehicle checkouts and day of launch. A potential risk 
mitigation option would be to allow or require Orbital to swap a Tier-2 vehicle with a 
launch-on-schedule vehicle in order to ensure the oldest vehicle launches first; while this 
reduces risk for Tier-2 launches, it arguably increases risk for conventional launches and 
 47
will likely only be permitted for low priority payloads that can accept the additional risk 
of a slightly older launch vehicle.    
Authorizing around-the-clock operations will also be key to the seven day 
schedule. The current launch model relies on a single crew working standard eight hour 
days with overtime authorized when necessary. Tier-2 launches would require three full 
crews available. This will require Orbital to hire additional personnel, not only to man the 
three crews but to ensure that personnel preparing vehicles to launch other payloads or on 
other ranges are not pulled away, causing undesired delays to other launch programs. It 
may be necessary to have dedicated ORS personnel on contract and permanently 
stationed at Vandenberg for quick call up. WROCI will also need to hire additional site 
personnel to ensure that the range can support pre-launch instrumentation requirements 
outside of normal duty hours. Three full crews are probably not necessary for WROCI, 
however they may incur budget issues should overtime be necessary to support Tier-2 
operations around the clock. In a budget constrained environment, this assumption may 
prove to be the biggest challenge for the seven day model.   
Along with hiring more personnel, all involved agencies will have to make a 
concerted effort to focus on proficiency training. The rapid launch concept only works if 
delays due to lack of proficiency can be minimized if not avoided completely. Executing 
dry runs, dress rehearsals, and personnel readiness evaluations periodically regardless of 
whether a Tier-2 launch is imminent will be critical to ensuring all personnel are trained 
to the required level of proficiency when a launch actually occurs.   
The final significant assumption is establishing a single standardized launch 
profile, or small selection of pre-approved launch profiles, in order to publish the OR and 
OD in advance, get an approved flight plan, and ensure that any Tier-2 payload can be 
interchanged with any Tier-2 launch vehicle. The final payload mass, vehicle mass, 
launch azimuth, flight path, and targeted transfer orbit will have to be identical for each 
mission using a specific launch profile to avoid having to repeat critical safety tasks. This 
will drastically impact how Tier-2 satellites are developed, but long term it will facilitate 
rapid launch. Failure to standardize Tier-2 missions will easily add an additional 30 days 
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to a launch schedule if each mission uses a unique profile instead of selecting the pre-
approved profile that most closely matches the mission requirements.   
In order to make this concept work, the AF or DoD will need to contract a single 
vehicle and a single range for Tier-2 launches. The requirements for maintaining different 
standby vehicles on multiple ranges are expensive and create logistical problems.   There 
are pros and cons for both of the vehicles examined in this thesis; the Pegasus is closer to 
achieving the seven day schedule, however Orbital only operates a single L-1011, which 
may not be able to relocate to Vandenberg with a couple days notice without adversely 
impacting other Pegasus missions. The Minotaur is better suited for hot standby, but it 
will take more process and proficiency improvement to reduce the launch schedule. 
Selecting a single Tier-2 vehicle is critical to the success of the launch-on-demand model, 
both from a cost and a readiness perspective.   
The simplest and most responsive solution would be to prepare launches for each 
type of payload and have them all set up on the launch pad awaiting final fueling and 
range checkout. While this would produce the shortest possible timeline, the cost of 
maintaining that many different payloads and their associated launch vehicles would be 
extremely prohibitive. Additionally, Vandenberg AFB currently only has a single launch 
pad designated for Minotaur I launches and there is only one L-1011 in operation. 
Building and maintaining additional launch pads and aircraft would further add to the 
cost of this method.  
Several improvements to the range structure and operating concept could help 
shorten the Tier-2 launch schedule. Currently, the WROCC B side is not used. Dedicating 
the B side to be available for Tier-2 launch preparation would reduce the impact to the 
range schedule by allowing launch-on-demand operations to run simultaneously with pre-
scheduled activities when resources weren’t conflicting. It would be difficult to conduct 
two launches at the same time as there is only one Area Control Center, Mission Flight 
Control Center, and one Command Management Center, therefore those personnel would 
need to split attention between operations, but with a separate Mission Room for the A 
side and B side and identical A and B side consoles in the Range Control Center, pre-
launch operations could be conducted at the same time as mission dress rehearsals, 
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launch operations, or other pre-launch activities with minimal impact. The limiting factor 
would be the availability of range instrumentation. 
The AF will have to reevaluate the range downsizing activities if Tier-2 is going 
to be a launch priority. Redundant systems at Vandenberg and several WR support sites 
have been mothballed in the last ten years to reduce operating costs; in order to support 
multiple operations or site down time due to depot level maintenance, some of these sites 
may need to be re-commissioned and additional sites may need to be acquired to ensure 
the range can support a Tier-2 launch at any time. In addition to the challenges involved 
in the allocation of instrumentation when there are conflicting operations occurring, 
frequency management also increases in complexity with the addition of an unplanned 
launch. Frequency conflicts may force other launch customers to delay or cancel 
operations to prevent radiating a Tier-2 vehicle or payload on a sensitive frequency. 
Operator readiness will be a challenge. It is not reasonable to dedicate personnel 
for Tier-2 launches or to increase the number of military operators on hand, however 
assigning a crew to be on call for a short duration ensures adequate time for specialized 
training and ramp up without delaying launch-on-demand activities or depriving 
personnel of launch experience during Tier-2 demand droughts. Crews could be assigned 
for a set period to ensure readiness and availability and to minimize the number of crews 
requiring readiness training each year without putting undue burden on crew members. A 
second option would be to use Air Force Reserve personnel for Tier-2 operations. 
Currently there are no reservist positions within 2 ROPS, but the addition of reservist 
billets could potentially reduce operator costs without sacrificing proficiency or launch 
experience. The on call period would optimally begin with a MDR and a RRR. In the 
event of mission declaration, the GRR could then be briefed on day one upon payload 
delivery, since the RRR will have already been accomplished. The briefing will change 
each month as crews and available instrumentation change, making it worthwhile to 
repeat the RRR with each new crew. 
The ROC and OD/LDA Mission Plans are a very time and labor intensive set of 
job aids required by the 30 SW. Both are developed by the ROC and approved by 
squadron leadership. In order to minimize extra work and streamline the development 
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timeline, the requirement to build an approved Mission Plan could be included as part of 
the ROC certification process. Since Mission Plans are tailored to the individual, this 
would allow for personalization by the operator with a nearly complete draft ready prior 
to being assigned to the on call crew. Formatting and verbiage could be updated during 
recurring classroom training or upon crew assignment to incorporate changes and lessons 
learned from the most recent launches. These administrative changes to the way Mission 
Plans are written would reduce the development time from weeks to a matter of hours. 
The final change necessary is to make ORS a higher priority. In the 2013 budget 
request, the Air Force proposed closing the ORS Office and instead allocating a small 
portion of the money saved to other military space programs to fund the integration of 
ORS into those programs. This strategy may work for ORS Tier-1 and Tier-3 launches, 
but would likely make Tier-2 unachievable any time in the near future. There needs to be 
a dedicated emphasis on changing the way the launch community does business in order 
to ensure it is able to keep up with the demand for increasing responsiveness of the 
satellite acquisition process. Without a single entity providing the necessary guidance and 
standardization between ORS programs, it is unlikely that the AF and DoD will be able to 
proceed with a launch-on-demand capability.   
2. Concept Validation 
The only guaranteed way to determine the feasibility of a seven day launch 
schedule is to exercise the concept. The Tac-Sat 2 launch was a good initial assessment of 
responsiveness, but future testing would need to go further, beginning with the 
establishment of a standardized ORS payload and launch profile.  
The U.S. Air Force Academy astronautical engineering department produces 
experimental satellites, called FalconSat, as senior capstone projects. An ORS satellite 
would be an excellent application. The payload should be commercial off the shelf 
(COTS), with a standard bus, and a predetermined size and mass.  
Certain pre-coordination events would have to be completed in advance. The 
UDS process would have to be completed for the “unknown” payload, based on a 
predetermined orbit, flight path, and payload mass. A launch vehicle would have to be 
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prepared in advance, but could be assigned an on call timeframe instead of a schedule 
launch date. 
The program capstone would be delivery of FalconSat to VAFB, kicking off the 
seven day launch countdown. To sufficiently test the capability, all launch notifications 
and final preparations could not be accomplished until the payload arrived. The launch 
date would have to be pre-scheduled to ensure range availability, but a certain amount of 
restraint will have to be exercised by all involved to prevent war gaming and task 
accomplishment prior to the launch window. The budget will have to be designed to 
permit military, civilian, and contractor personnel to work shifts around the clock in order 
to launch on time. Subsequent FalconSat payloads could be designed and delivered 
meeting the ORS Tier-2 profile to allow for additional testing and exercising of the ORS 
concept.   
Results from this sort of operational concept validation would provide valuable 
feedback to ORS planners, launch vehicle companies, and range personnel, and would 
pave the way for future launch-on-demand improvements and successes. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As it currently stands, neither launch vehicle is capable of launching within seven 
days. However, various opportunities for improvements exist that could reduce the 
current estimates of eight days for the Pegasus and ten days for the Minotaur I down to 
the desired seven day schedule. Changes will be needed doctrinally, procedurally, and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a variety of steps that must be taken in order to make spacelift more 
responsive in order to support the seven day launch schedule required to support a Tier-2 
ORS mission. These interest items can be broken down into three categories; equipment, 
personnel, and administrative. All need to be addressed in order for the spacelift 
community to convert from a launch-on-schedule to a launch-on-demand culture. 
1. Equipment 
The DoD will need to select one launch vehicle to support ORS Tier-2 launches 
and dedicate training, funding, and focus on making that vehicle as responsive as 
possible. These Tier-2 vehicles would need to be prepositioned at the launch vehicle 
processing facility with all activities complete up to payload integration. A rotation 
would likely need to be established to swap out a stand-by vehicle with a new vehicle 
earmarked to support an on-schedule mission to ensure that the oldest launch vehicles 
always launch first in order to mitigate the risk of keeping vehicles in stand-by for long 
periods of time. ICBM launch failures, like the one that occurred 27 July 2011, indicate 
the risk associated with maintaining an aging fleet of standby launch vehicles (The 
Associated Press 2011, n.p.). Additionally, launch vehicle personnel will need to review 
and improve all processes and procedures in order to streamline vehicle preparation and 
further shorten the launch timeline. Currently both the Minotaur I and the Pegasus are 
outside of the seven day launch schedule objective, but the most effective way to reduce 
the time required will be procedurally. This may involve reordering the way a launch 
vehicle is prepared for launch in order to accomplish as many tasks prior to payload 
delivery as possible, which will reduce the overall timeline from an ORS perspective. 
The AF will need to reevaluate the current range downsizing and mothballing of 
sensors that may be critical to ORS launch success. New processes may need to be 
developed to ensure that mothballed sites can be activated on short notice to support a 
Tier-2 launch or additional funds may need to be allocated to support additional 
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instrumentation sites. The utilization of the WROCC A and B sides may need to be 
addressed in order to maximize the number of operations the center can support 
simultaneously and thereby minimize the impact of ORS launch operations to existing 
launch-on-schedule operations. 
2. Personnel 
Funding will need to be allocated for dedicated ORS personnel on contract with 
the launch agency. This will eliminate conflict from launch-on-demand missions 
occurring at the same time and launch-on-schedule missions involving the same launch 
vehicle. Additionally, by hiring personnel whose primary responsibility is ORS Tier-2 
launches, the opportunity exists to maximize training and efficiency of personnel for 
rapid launch missions well in advance of mission declaration. 
Similarly, the AF will need to establish an on-call routine for ORS operators or 
create and staff reservist billets to supplement and/or fulfill on-call Tier-2 launch duties. 
This will allow sufficient time for specialized training and ramp up without delaying 
ORS activities or negatively impacting military range operators. By cycling through 
dedicated crews for set periods of time, range operations personnel will be able to 
accomplish relevant readiness reviews, develop mission plans, and complete range-only 
dress rehearsals without interfering with or delaying other launch operations. 
Finally, the AF, launch agency, and contracted support personnel will need to be 
authorized to perform around the clock operations in support of Tier-2 launches. This will 
require increasing the number of personnel on contract to man three full crews on eight 
hour shifts, consistent with assumptions made during the TacSat-2 launch. Personnel 
costs may prove to be prohibitive; if so, workload distribution may need to be assessed in 
order to maximize the work that can be done by smaller crews or on longer work shifts.  
3. Administrative 
In order for Tier-2 spacelift responsiveness to be possible, ORS must become a 
DoD and AF priority. The AF ORS Office will likely be closed in 2013 due to budget 
cuts; some funding will need to be allocated and the office will need to remain open if the 
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DoD and AF intend to pursue responsive spacelift. Additional funds will need to be 
committed in order to procure vehicles and develop off-the-shelf standardized ORS 
payloads. This will require extensive reworking of the current budget to find the money 
to fund ORS.   
AF doctrine and professional development programs will need to be reworked to 
emphasize responsive spacelift and operationally responsive space. This will ensure that 
decision makers are aware of ORS capabilities available to them, with particular focus 
needed on Combatant Commanders who will be the driving force behind Tier-2 mission 
requirements. Standardizing ORS payloads and launch profiles will help to increase the 
number of critical administrative tasks that can be accomplished prior to mission 
declaration. Additionally, doctrine must be written in a way that ensures the launch 
community is able to keep up with the increasing responsiveness of the satellite 
acquisition process. Educating senior leaders in all services on the options and potential 
of responsive payloads and launch vehicles will help ORS become a standard operating 
procedure.   
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
A Capabilities and Limitations (C&L) Report serves to inform the warfighter and 
fielding decision authorities by presenting the potential operational effectiveness and 
suitability of a system from an unbiased Operational Test Agency, based on that system’s 
capabilities and requirements documents. It provides an operational test perspective on 
the developmental capabilities and limitations based on existing testing and evaluation 
data (Air Force Instruction 99-103 2009, 49). Using all relevant historical launch data, a 
C&L Report could be compiled for all available launch vehicles launching from all 
available launch sites. This information would reveal far more detailed estimates for 
current launch capabilities than this thesis presented and would better identify processes 
that require streamlining in order to afford the flexibility and responsiveness needed to 
meet ORS objectives. By expanding the report to include all vehicles and all launch sites, 
it is possible that a more suitable and responsive launch vehicle exists that can meet the 
rapid launch requirements of a Tier-2 mission. 
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Additional missions like TacSat-2 are excellent opportunities for additional 
research into the potential for increasing the responsiveness of existing launch vehicles. 
Programs like FalconSat, the ORS satellite family, and TacSat can be used to put Tier-2 
principles into practice and evaluate the launch community’s ability to meet a rapid 
launch timeline. The only way to establish whether or not a seven day Tier-2 schedule is 
possible is to attempt it. 
  
 57
LIST OF REFERENCES 
30th Space Wing Instruction 13–203. 9 August 2011. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 2 
September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/30sw/publication/ 
30swi13-203/30swi13-203.pdf. 
30th Space Wing Instruction 91–101. 30 July 2009. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 2 
September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/30sw/publication/ 
30swi91-101/30swi91-101.pdf. 
392d Training Squadron. “Spacelift Fundamentals.” Technical Training. Vandenberg 
AFB: Air Education and Training Command, October 2005. 
Air Force Doctrine Document 1. 17 November 2003. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 9 
January 2011. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/ 
publication/afdd1/afdd1.pdf. 
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2. 23 August 1998. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 19 
January 2011. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/ 
afdd2-2/afdd2-2.pdf. 
Air Force Instruction 10-1211. 17 July 2006. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 14 July 
2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/ 
afi10-1211/afi10-1211.pdf. 
Air Force Instruction 99-103. 20 March 2009. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 22 
September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_te/publication/ 
afi99-103/afi99-103.pdf. 
Air Force Policy Directive 10-12. 1 February 1996. Air Force E-Publishing. Accessed 8 
September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/ 
publication/afpd10-12/afpd10-12.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1202. 15 November 2008. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 14 July 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/ 
afspc/publication/afspci10-1202/afspci10-1202.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1208. 11 January 2011. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 2 June 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/ 
af_a3_5/publication/afpd10-12/afpd10-12.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Instruction 10-1213. 24 August 2012. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 29 September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/ 
production/1/afspc/publication/afspci10-1213/afspci10-1213.pdf. 
 58
Air Force Space Command Instruction 36-2202 Volume 1. 1 January 2010. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 29 September 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/ 
production/1/afspc/publication/afspci36-2202v1/afspci36-2202v1.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710 Volume 1. 1 July 2004. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 2 June 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/ 
1/afspc/publication/afspcman91-710v1/afspcman91-710v1.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2. 1 July 2004. Air Force E-
Publishing. Accessed 15 July 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/ 
afspc/publication/afspcman91-710v2/afspcman91-710v2.pdf. 
Air Force Space Command Manual 91-711. 1 February 2007. Air Force E-Publishing. 
Accessed 2 June 2012. http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afspc/ 
publication/afspcman91-711/afspcman91-711.pdf. 
Allard, Wayne and Bill Nelson. “Defense Space Activities: Continuation of Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program’s Progress to Date Subject to Some 
Uncertainty.” 24 June 2004. U.S Government Accountability Office. Accessed 9 
July 2012. http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92672.html. 
Bauer, Thomas P. et al. “Systems Engineering for Responsive Launch.” 4th Responsive 
Space Conference. Los Angeles: AIAA, 2006. Accessed 9 July 2012. 
www.scorpius.com/Documents/RS4_Bauer.pdf . 
Brown, Kendall K. “A Concept of Operations and Technology Implications for 
Operationally Responsive Space.” Air & Space Power Journal (2004). Accessed 
9 June 2012. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/brown2.html. 
Buccholz, Edward. “Minotaur I NROL-66 Program Support Manager Sheet.” 
Vandenberg AFB, 1 February 2011.  
Buchholz, Edward. “Pegasus AIM Program Support Manager Sheet.” Vandenberg AFB, 
17 April 2007.  
Cooper, Lawrence A. “Assured Access to Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and 
Launch-On-Demand.” Airpower Journal (1992). Accessed 9 June 2012. 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/sum92/cooper.htm. 
Cooper, Lawrence. “The Strategy of Responsive Space: Assured Access to Space 
Revisited.” 1st Responsive Space Conference. Redondo Beach: AIAA, 2003. 
Accessed 30 May 2012. http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS1/ 
SESSION1/COOPER/1003P.PDF. 
Day, Dwayne. Vandenberg Air Force Base. Accessed 9 October 2012. 
http://centennialofflight.gov/essay/SPACEFLIGHT/VAFB/SP47.htm. 
 59
Department of Defense Directive 3200.11. 27 December 2007. Defense Technical 
Information Center. Accessed 12 June 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ 
corres/pdf/320011p.pdf. 
Department of Defense Directive 3200.11-D. June 1983. Law, Science & Public Health 
Program Site. Accessed 11 June 2012. http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/ 
corres/pdf/320011d_0683/p320011d.pdf. 
Everett, Terry. Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing 
Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities. GAO-06–449. Washington, 
DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2006. Accessed 9 June 
2012. http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/249261.pdf. 
Foust, Jeff. Operationally Responsive Spacelift: A solution seeking a problem? 13 
October 2003. Accessed 18 March 2010. http://www.thespacereview.com/ 
article/52/1. 
Graham, William. Orbital Minotaur I launches with ORS-1 following eventful 
countdown. 29 June 2011. Accessed 23 April 2012. 
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/06/live-orbital-minotaur-i-launch-ors-1/. 
HQ AFSPC/DRS. Mission Needs Statement AFSPC 001–01 for Operationally 
Responsive Spacelift. Peterson AFB: USAF, 2001. Accessed 30 May 2011. 
http://www.smad.com/ORS%20MNS%20_Final%20Dec01_.pdf. 
Kennedy Media Gallery. Ed. Jeanne Ryba. 6 March 2009. Accessed 15 June 2012. 
http://mediaarchive.ksc.nasa.gov/search.cfm?cat=117. 
Kim, Yool and Gary McLeod. “Toward a New Strategy for ORS.” High Frontier vol. 6, 
no.3 (2010): 88–93. Accessed 9 June 2012. http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/ 
document/AFD-101019-072.pdf. 
King, Ledyard. Report Warns of Weather Satellites ‘Rapid Decline’. 2 May 2012. 
Accessed 8 May 2012. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/news/story/2012-
05-02/weather-satellites-forecast-storms/54708804/1. 
Kneller, Edward W. “National Security Space Office Responsive Space Operations 
Architecture Study.” 4th Responsive Space Conference. Los Angeles: AIAA, 
2006. Accessed 16 June 2012. http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS4/ 
Papers/RS4_1003P_Kneller.pdf. 
Kolodziejski, Paul J. “Operationally Responsive Spacelift for the U.S. Air Force.” 1st 




Ledbetter, Titus. ORS Office Presses Ahead with Plans Despite Looming Closure. 7 May 
2012. Accessed 9 July 2012. http://www.spacenews.com/article/ors-office-
presses-ahead-plans-despite-looming-closure. 
“Minotaur I Fact Sheet.” 2012. Orbital Sciences Corporation. Accessed 2 June 2012. 
http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/Minotaur_I_Fact.pdf. 
“Minotaur I User’s Guide.” January 2006. Orbital Sciences Corporation. Accessed 2 
June 2012. http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/Minotaur_Guide.pdf. 
Moskios, Thomas. “Risk Analysis Report for the Tac-Sat 2 Mission.” 17 November 
2006. NASA. Accessed 5 June 2012. http://code210.gsfc.nasa.gov/nsoc/ 
Tac%20Sat%202_WFF_RAR.pdf. 
NASA Policy Directive 8610.7D. 31 January 2008. NASA. Accessed 4 July 2012. 
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PD_8610_007D_/N_PD_8610_007D__m
ain.pdf. 
National Research Council. Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 2000. 
National Security Space Office. “Plan for Operationally Responsive Space - A Report to 
Congressional Defense Committees.” 17 April 2007. Responsive Space. Accessed 
19 January 2011. http://www.responsivespace.com/Conferences/RS5/ 
4=17=07%20ORS%20Plan.pdf. 
Noel, Jeremy, Raymond Escorpizo and Edward Jones. “Transforming the National 
Spacelift Architecture.” 2nd Responsive Space Conference. Los Angeles: AIAA, 
2004. Accessed 27 May 2012. http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS2/ 
SESSION%20PAPERS/SESSION%202/NOEL/2003P.pdf. 
O’Connor, Bryan. “NASA Range Safety Annual Report.” 2010. NASA. Accessed 27 May 
2012. http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/Range_Safety/Annual_Report/2010/Documents/ 
2010_NASA_RANGE_SAFETY_ANNUAL_REPORT.pdf. 
Operationally Responsive Spacelift Initiative. 21 July 2011. Accessed 24 March 2012. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/ors.htm. 
Orbital Sciences Corporation. 2012. Accessed 12 May 2012. http://www.orbital.com/. 
“Pegasus User’s Guide.” June 2007. Orbital Sciences Corporation. Accessed 2 June 
2012. http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/pegasus_ug.pdf. 
Pieczynski, Mark. “Operationally Responsive Space from a Launch Vehicle Perspective.” 
High Frontier vol. 6, no. 3 (2010): 94–95. Accessed 26 May 2012. 
http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101019-072.pdf. 
 61
Range Commander’s Council. 22 May 2012. Accessed 22 May 2012. 
http://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Pages/default.aspx. 
Range Commanders Council Document 319–10. 4 August 2010. White Sands Missile 
Range. Accessed 14 July 2012. https://wsmrc2vger.wsmr.army.mil/rcc/manuals/ 
319-10/319-10%20Flight%20Termination%20Systems%20Commonality%20 
Standard%20(Public%20Release).pdf. 
“Range Safety Operations Requirements.” Vandenberg AFB: 30th SW Safety, 2 
November 2007.  
Remillard, Stephen K. “The Long and Winding Road to Operationally Responsive 
Spacelift.” Air & Space Power Journal (2007) Accessed 27 May 2012. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/ 
remillardspr07.html. 
Roth, John. “Benefits of Returning to the Original Vision of Operationally Responsive 
Space.” High Frontier vol. 6, no. 3 (2010): 83–87. Accessed 27 May 2012. 
http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101019-072.pdf. 
Schoneman, Scott et al. “Minotaur I Demonstration of Responsive Launch for the 
TacSat-2 Mission.” 5th Responsive Space Conference. Los Angeles: AIAA, 2007. 
Accessed 4 July 2012. http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS5/ 
SESSION%20PAPERS/SESSION%205/5002_SCHONEMAN/5002P.pdf. 
Seo, David. “Responsive Range Operations.” 4th Responsive Space Conference. Los 
Angeles: AIAA, 2006. Accessed 27 May 2012. http://www.responsivespace.com/ 
Papers/RS4/Papers/RS4_2005P_Seo.pdf. 
“Space Launch Sample Mission 1 Mission Requirements Document.” 18 May 2011. 
Cryptocomb. Accessed 14 July 2012. http://cryptocomb.org 
/MRD1_(JMAPS)_v2.pdf. 
The Associated Press. ICBM destroyed during launch for safety reasons. 27 July 2011. 
Accessed 13 January 2013. http://www.armytimes.com/article/20110727/ 
NEWS/107270323/ICBM-destroyed-during-launch-safety-reasons. 
Tomme, Edward B. “The Myth of the Tactical Satellite.” Air & Space Power Journal 
(2006). Accessed 14 January 2013. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 
airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/tomme.html. 
Underwood, Bruce E., Steven E. Kremer and Wayne Woodhams. “NASA’s Wallops 
Flight Facility Rapid Responsive Range Operations Initiative.” 2nd Responsive 




U.S. Government Accountabililty Office. “DoD Needs to Further Clarify the 
Operationally Responsive Space Concept.” July 2008. Accessed 24 March 2010. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/278188.html. 
Vandenberg Air Force Base - Home. 2012. Accessed 4 October 2012.  
http:// www.vandenberg.af.mil/ . 
Wade, Mark. Encyclopedia Astronautica Tacsat-2. 16 December 2006. Accessed 8 
September 2012. http://www.astronautix.com/craft/tacsat2.htm. 
Wertz, James R. and Wiley J. Larson, Space Mission Analysis and Design. 3rd. El 
Segundo: Microcosm Press, 2003.  
“Western Range User Handbook.” Vandenberg AFB: 2d Range Operations Squadron, 
March 2009.  
  
 63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.  Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2.  Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
